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ABSTRACT
This article assesses the contents of the majority of employer-union partnership
agreements signed in Britain from 1990 to 2007. Few agreements contain the
expected partnership principles and most express modest overall aims and limited
ambition. Typical agreements are substantively hollow with more than one-third
containing no substantive provisions; and procedurally biased, with more than four-
fifths offering unions greater involvement in employers’ decisions. Partnership
agreements continue the procedural bias of traditional British collective agree-
ments representing the lowest common denominator of agreement – unions
work towards the success of the enterprise in return for involvement in employ-
ers’ decisions. The implications for New Labour’s Third Way approach and the policy
of encouraging voluntary partnership agreements to promote fairness at work are
considered.
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Introduction
An important aspect of New Labour government policy in Britain since1997 was to encourage employers and trade unions to sign partnershipagreements that involved ‘labor-management cooperation for mutual
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gains’ (Kelly, 2004: 268). The theme of partnership formed an important part
of New Labour’s broader Third Way approach to industrial relations (Brown,
2000). This approach relied upon voluntary partnership agreements and rep-
resented a non-statutory approach to industrial relations as opposed to the
statutory support for integrative relations found in the more coordinated mar-
ket economies of Europe. New Labour’s approach assumed that employers
and unions would functionally adapt to more competitive economic circum-
stances without recourse to legislation (Heery, 2002). Subsequent debates
evaluating partnership agreements, therefore, help to inform a wider assess-
ment of New Labour’s record in government and the potential of the Third
Way approach to develop a progressive workplace consensus in Britain.
Latest estimates suggest New Labour’s approach met with some success,
with 248 partnership agreements signed between 1990 and 2007, covering
almost ten percent of all British employees (Bacon and Samuel, 2009: 238).
The implications of signing partnership agreements for trade unions and their
members, however, have generated a lively debate between advocates and crit-
ics of partnership. Advocates argue that increased industrial relations cooper-
ation may produce mutual gains. This outcome may occur because
cooperation allows employers to develop efficient working practices that gen-
erate higher profits, and then share these gains with employees through
improved wages and enhanced employment security (Kochan and Osterman,
1994). The positive impact of partnership may even extend further to help
reverse the decline of British trade unions, if unions demonstrate their poten-
tial to make a positive contribution to organisational success (Terry, 2003).
However, critics will have none of this. They argue, in contrast to the mutual
gains view, that partnership agreements prioritise employer interests and
employees will gain little (Kelly, 2004; Martínez Lucio and Stuart, 2005).
Thus, critics expect partnership to accelerate the decline of British trade
unions, highlighting a supposed inability to influence employers and failure to
protect core terms and conditions of union members.
Given such contrasting claims, it is surprising that to date no studies have
assessed the actual contents of a sizable and representative sample of partner-
ship agreements in Britain. This omission is notable because partnership agree-
ments are likely to express the terms on which employers and unions establish
dialogue. This article partly addresses this gap by presenting the first compre-
hensive analysis of the contents of 126 partnership agreements; the largest sam-
ple of partnership agreements collected to date, more than half (51%) of all 248
agreements estimated to have been signed in Britain between 1990 and 2007
(Bacon and Samuel, 2009: 235). The analysis shows that partnership agree-
ments express modest aims and limited ambition, with many containing few
partnership principles. These agreements are also substantively hollow, with
more than one-third containing no substantive provisions; and are procedurally
biased, with more than four-fifths offering unions greater involvement in
employers’ decisions.
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The principles, provisions and balance of interests in
partnership agreements
Advocates and critics of partnership have different views of the principles,
provisions and balance of interests reflected in the contents of partnership
agreements. In terms of principles, most commentators assume partnership
agreements in Britain contain a set of shared values and beliefs that establish
the behaviours, attitudes and expectations required for cooperative industrial
relations. The most well known in Britain are the two sets of key partnership
principles promoted by the employers’ organisation, the Involvement and
Participation Association (IPA, 1992; see Guest and Peccei, 2001), and the
Trades Union Congress (TUC, 1997; see Martínez Lucio and Stuart, 2005; Terry,
2003). Both organisations have encouraged employers and unions to sign part-
nership agreements, and provided partnership principles to help them establish
a shared understanding of what partnership should involve. Such principles
underpin the substantive and procedural provisions contained in partnership
agreements generally considered necessary for industrial relations cooperation
and gain sharing.
However, it is not known how many partnership agreements in Britain con-
tain these principles, and whether the substantive and procedural provisions of
agreements reflect mutual interests. Indeed, the prevailing critical view suggests
partnership agreements will reflect employers’ interests given the contraction of
collective bargaining and decline in trade union recognition since the 1980s.
Dominant employers, it is argued, capture most, if not all, of any gains from
such arrangements by avoiding disputes while seeking to restructure and reduce
labour costs (Kelly, 2005). This view suggests that employer interests will dom-
inate the contents of partnership agreements. This section reviews these issues.
Principles
Creating a partnership relationship requires strategic commitments from employ-
ers and unions to a shared set of aims (Guest and Peccei, 2001). According to
Knell’s (1999: i) early study of 15 British partnership cases, for example, organi-
sations adopting a partnership approach shared a ‘remarkable commonality of
vision, value and purpose’. Common principles may also be expected to be
expressed in formal partnership agreements because the IPA and the TUC widely
publicised sets of principles for organisations developing partnership agreements.
On this basis, advocates of partnership expect written partnership agreements to
outline bold aims and high ambitions for partnership, including mutual gains, to
establish the basis for a progressive workplace consensus.
Turning to these principles in detail, the IPA (1992) encourages employers
and employee representatives to make three commitments to partnership values,
covering ‘the success of the enterprise; building trust through greater involve-
ment; and respect for the legitimacy of other partners’. Four ‘building blocks’
should also be adopted, including commitments covering partnership processes –
‘informing and consulting staff about issues at workplace and company level; and
the effective representation of people’s views within the organisation’ – and the
expected outcomes from partnership – ‘recognition of employees’ desire for secu-
rity and the employers’ need to maximise flexibility’, and ‘sharing success within
the company’ (IPA, 1992). The TUC (1997) advise employers and unions devel-
oping partnership agreements to sign up to six principles, covering values – ‘a com-
mitment to the success of the organisation’ and ‘a recognition of and respect for
the legitimate roles of the employer and the trade union’, process – ‘openness and
transparency’, and expected outcomes – ‘a focus on the quality of working life’,
‘a commitment to employment security’, and ‘adding value to all concerned’.
It is not known, however, whether and how many partnership agreements
include these IPA and TUC partnership principles. Indeed, there is some evidence
that partnership agreements may be heterogeneous, reflecting specific organisa-
tional circumstances (cf. Johnstone et al., 2009; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004). As
partnership is an imprecise concept, agreements reached in the low-trust context
of British industrial relations may include few of the ambitious principles of the
IPA and TUC, and in reality they may ‘represent the lowest common denomina-
tor of agreement’ (Bacon and Storey, 2000: 410). This outcome may occur because
corporate governance in Britain may deter employers from making promises they
cannot keep (Deakin et al., 2002; Thompson, 2003). Critics of partnership also
suggest that the contraction of collective bargaining and the decline in union
recognition since the 1980s will result in partnership agreements reflecting
employers’ interests (Kelly, 2005). Partnership values are also believed to deny dif-
ferent class interests in the employment relationship, promote union moderation,
and result in union concessions to employers’ demands (Upchurch et al., 2008).
The first aim of this article, therefore, is to determine which, if any, IPA and
TUC principles feature in British partnership agreements. It is important to
establish whether employers and unions have made reciprocal commitments
that may provide the basis for high-trust relations to support partnership, or
whether employer interests predominate.
Provisions
The partnership principles discussed above are likely to shape the specific sub-
stantive and procedural provisions expressed in partnership agreements. It is
claimed that partnership agreements extend joint regulation to address issues
previously decided only by managers (Samuel, 2005; Wills, 2004). The most
important substantive issue for unions is, arguably, an employer commitment
to provide employment security, if not job security, often in exchange for
increases in flexible working (so called ‘flexicurity’ arrangements) (Sisson et al.,
1999). However, it is by no means clear that employers commit to providing
employment security in partnership agreements. Thompson (2003) suggests
increased market competition and shareholder pressure in liberal market
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economies will prevent employers from making meaningful substantive promises
in partnership agreements because they will be unable to keep such promises.
Evidence supporting this view includes Guest and Peccei’s (2001: 224) finding
that fewer than one-third of IPA member organisations made a formal com-
mitment to employment security and fewer than one-quarter included a formal
guarantee of no compulsory redundancies. This pattern is consistent with sug-
gestions that employers prefer to make unilateral decisions rather than extend
joint regulation to a broader range of issues.
As well as employment and job security, it is generally expected that part-
nership agreements will be substantively rich and feature provisions addressing
workers’ qualitative needs (Hyman, 1997). These provisions may include employee
training and development, increased employee involvement, single status, fair
treatment, and practices to improve work-life-balance (Haynes and Allen, 2001;
Heery, 2002). Many of these provisions do not normally feature in traditional
collective agreements (cf. Dunn and Wright, 1994). However, whether or not
partnership agreements broaden the range of substantive issues subject to joint
regulation remains an important issue to be addressed.
In addition, some commentators assume that, as well as being substantively
rich, a prominent feature of partnership agreements is a procedural emphasis
on joint consultation. The available evidence suggests this involves creating joint
consultative committees to consider issues previously outside the traditional
bargaining agenda (Marks et al., 1998; Samuel, 2007; Wills, 2004). Critics of
partnership, however, suggest employers will not sign agreements with unions
that limit their autonomy (Kelly, 2005). Few partnership agreements are likely,
therefore, to provide the means for unions to influence management decisions
in practice. Indeed, where joint consultation expands, critics suggest this should
not be interpreted as extended joint governance because unions are merely co-
opted to support the employers’ agenda.
Traditional collective agreements in Britain, signed during earlier periods of
higher union density, are characterised by a procedural bias concerned with the
distribution of power and authority, which attempts to prevent the parties
defecting from their agreed roles (Dunn and Wright, 1994; Flanders, 1968).
This bias reflects the low-trust relations typical in British industrial relations.
Thus, it seems plausible that partnership agreements, being contemporary col-
lective agreements, will be path dependent to a degree, displaying a similar pro-
cedural bias to traditional collective agreements rooted in low-trust relations.
However, this possibility remains to be tested empirically. The second aim of
this article, therefore, is to analyse the substantive scope and the procedural
provisions expressed in British partnership agreements signed 1990–2007.
The balance of interests
The final question explored in this article is the extent to which partnership
agreements in Britain contain expressions of mutual interests and whether this
has changed over time. Kelly (2004) theorises partnership agreements as falling
434 Work, employment and society Volume 24  Number 3  September 2010
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along a continuum of power. The distinction is made between ‘employer-
dominant agreementsmarked by a balance of power favourable to the employer’
at one end of the continuum; and at the other extreme, ‘labour-parity agree-
ments, where there is a more even balance of power’ (2004: 271, original
emphasis). Based on Guest and Peccei’s (2001) survey of IPA member organisa-
tions, it seems likely that most partnership agreements lie towards the employer
dominant pole of this continuum and contain more provisions favouring
employer interests than favouring those of labour.
Stronger criticisms of partnership go further, arguing that employers invari-
ably dominate cooperative relationships in liberal market economies (Kelly,
2005). Thus few, if any, principles and provisions reflecting labour interests are
expected to be found in British partnership agreements. Indeed, Thompson (2003)
suggests this outcome is inevitable because employers cannot realistically
keep promises to share financial gains with employees, or to provide employ-
ment security, let alone job security, given intensified product-market competi-
tion and shareholder pressure. However, such arguments play down potential
variation in the relative balance of power between employers and unions. In
certain instances, it seems likely that stronger unions may extract employer
concessions before they sign partnership agreements.
It must be kept in mind therefore, that union strength could significantly
affect the relative balance of interests expressed in partnership agreements. This
point is particularly important when distinguishing between private and public
sector partnership agreements in Britain (Bacon and Samuel, 2009). Private sec-
tor employers may sign partnership agreements merely to coerce weaker unions
into legitimising managers’ decisions (Kelly, 2005; Samuel, 2007). In contrast,
stronger and potentially adversarial unions in the public sector may insist that
partnership allows them to influence employers’ plans to modernise public ser-
vices (cf. Samuel, 2007). Thus, while public sector employers must consult with
unions to facilitate reform, strong public sector unions seem unlikely to commit
to unspecified substantive change without meaningful involvement in shaping
reform plans. For reasons of relative union strength, therefore, it might be
expected that the contents of public sector partnership agreements will reflect a
relative balance of interests but will lack substantive scope given disagreements
over the agenda to reform public services.
Once again, however, there is little empirical evidence with which to
address these important issues. Thus, the final aim of this article is to evaluate
the relative balance of interests in the contents of partnership agreements in
Britain over time and by private and public sector.
Research method
The research analysed the contents of the largest sample of partnership agree-
ments collected to date in Britain, involving 126 agreements drawn from an
estimated total of 248 agreements signed between 1990 and 2007 (Bacon and
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Samuel, 2009). To gather as many partnership agreements as possible, both
authors searched the internet for pronouncements of partnership deals between
employers and independent trade unions or staff associations (for full details see
Bacon and Samuel, 2009: 235–6). The authors then searched the websites of the
IPA, the TUC, the former Department of Trade and Industry (including the now
closed Partnership at Work fund) and all available British trade union websites.
The next phase involved seeking confirmation and copies of partnership agree-
ments from the employers and unions identified by this exhaustive search. Most
provided copies for analysis.
The analysis is based on full copies of 126 partnership agreements and
excludes the following types of agreements: arrangements for longstanding
good industrial relations without a written partnership agreement between the
primary parties; statements to work towards partnership; single-issue agree-
ments couched in partnership terms (for example health and safety agreements,
and learning agreements); non-union agreements; short-term Partnership Fund
projects; and standard recognition agreements simply using the label ‘partner-
ship’. Excluding these agreements increases the likelihood that agreements have
common contents and so this study does not intend to capture the full range of
usage of the term partnership in British collective agreements.
Comparing our sample of 126 agreements with the 122 other known part-
nership agreements in Britain (N = 248) (Bacon and Samuel, 2009) suggests
that the agreements examined here are representative in terms of sector, indus-
try, region of operation, and the number of signatory unions. Therefore, this is
the most representative analysis of partnership agreements in Britain to date,
combining the largest independently collected sample of partnership agreements
and the broadest range of organisations with these agreements.
Of the 126 agreements analysed, most (112) continued in operation by
December 2007. Six were signed before 1997; 26 signed in New Labour’s first
term of office (1997–2000); 48 signed in New Labour’s second term (2001–4);
and 46 signed in New Labour’s third term (2005–7). Recent agreements are
over-represented as almost three-quarters (74%) of our sample of agreements
are five years old or less. However, this over-representation does not appear to
affect the findings as statistical analysis (not reported here) shows no significant
associations between the contents and age of agreements, or between the con-
tents and survival of agreements.
Within the sample, most agreements are in health and social work (39%)
and public administration (20%), with the remainder in other business services
(9%), transport and communications (9%) and manufacturing (7%). The
majority are public sector partnership agreements (three-fifths of the 126 agree-
ments), which is representative of the estimated population of partnership agree-
ments in Britain for 1990–2007 (three-fifths of 248 agreements) (see Bacon and
Samuel, 2009: 237). Over four-fifths (88%) of these agreements involve large
organisations with 500 employees or more. Once again, however, statistical
analysis (not reported here) shows no significant associations between the con-
tents of partnership agreements and sector or organisational size.
Findings: principles, provisions and the balance of interests
As discussed earlier, advocates assume partnership agreements in Britain will
reflect IPA and TUC partnership principles, contain substantive commitments
to exchange inter alia employment security for flexible working, and make pro-
cedural provisions for joint consultation over an extended range of issues. Thus,
partnership agreements are expected to reflect the mutual interests of employ-
ers and labour. In contrast, critics argue that partnership agreements offer
employers the opportunity to capitalise on relative union weakness and further
employer interests. Thus, partnership agreements are expected to contain few,
if any, employer concessions to labour. This section considers the extent to
which our sample of 126 partnership agreements conforms to these competing
expectations.
Principles
The percentages of partnership agreements containing IPA and TUC partner-
ship principles are presented in Table 1. Nearly all agreements (91%) commit
the parties to focus on the success of the organisation, a central partnership
principle for both the IPA and the TUC. The findings show, however, that many
partnership agreements do not include other key IPA or TUC principles. Only
just over one-half of agreements (56%) include statements on building trust
through greater involvement, possibly reflecting a mutual recognition of low-
trust relations typical in British industrial relations.
The IPA and TUC principle ‘respect for the legitimacy of the other partners’
is difficult to measure. The principle of explicitly recognising both parties’
rights appears in only just over one-quarter of the agreements (28%), in state-
ments recognising the union’s right to represent their members and manage-
ment’s right to manage. The union’s right to represent their members is
recognised in just over one-half of agreements (52%). As the partnership debate
suggests, union rights are at risk in these agreements, this is our preferred mea-
sure of respecting the legitimacy of the partners to these agreements. However,
over two-fifths of agreements (46%) contain neither statement; just over one-
quarter (28%) recognise the union’s right to represent their members but do not
contain a clause on management’s right to manage; and few (just 2%) recognise
management’s right to manage but do not contain a clause on the union’s right
to represent their members.
Moving from values to process (Table 1), two-fifths of agreements (41%)
include content relating to the discussion of strategic level issues, and we take
this as a commitment to the IPA principle of ‘informing and consulting staff
about issues at workplace and company levels’.
Turning to the outcomes expressed in partnership agreements, one-half of
agreements include mutual benefits statements to share success with employees.
Surprisingly, perhaps, just one in 10 agreements include specific statements that
commit employers to sharing financial success within the organisation (11%).
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As explained above, employers do not make a general commitment to sharing
organisational success in one-half of agreements, so it is not surprising that only
one-fifth of agreements contain a commitment to employment security (21%),
and fewer (16%) contain a commitment to improving the quality of working
life. Indeed, our sample of partnership agreements contains no employment
guarantees and the few commitments to employment security that are expressed
are normative. Significantly, only just over one in ten agreements (11%) include
‘flexicurity’ statements combining employment security for employees and max-
imising flexibility for employers. Thus, the lack of employer commitments on
employment and job security may help to explain why job security does not
appear to differ between employers with partnership agreements and those
without (Kelly, 2004).
The typical British partnership agreement contains less than half of the six
IPA principles (mean 2.8). Six agreements (5%) contain no IPA principles and
only four agreements include all six. Seven in ten partnership agreements fea-
ture three or fewer IPA principles. Many partnership agreements also contain
few TUC partnership principles. Out of five principles (mean 2.3), only four
agreements contain all five, and three in five contain two or fewer. If genuine
partnership agreements must include all IPA or TUC partnership principles,
then just four agreements (3%) meet this strict criterion: Derby Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust, 2004; Home Office Police Staff Council, 2005; Lyondell
Chemical Group, 2004; and Thames Water, 2000.
Table 1 The principles contained in partnership agreements, 1990–2007 (n=126)
IPA and TUC Principlesa % including
Values
Success of the enterprise (IPA)
Commitment to the success of the organisation (TUC)
91
Building trust through greater staff involvement (IPA) 56
Respect for the legitimacy of the other partners (IPA)
Recognition and respect for the legitimate role of the employer and union(s) (TUC)
(Recognising the union’s right-to-represent their members and management’s right-to-manage)b
52
(28)
Process
Informing and consulting staff about issues at workplace and company level (IPA) 41
Outcomes
Sharing success within the company (IPA)
Adding value to all concerned (sharing financial success) (TUC)
(Sharing financial success within the organisation)b
50
(11)
Commitment to employment security (TUC) 22
Focus on the quality of working life (TUC) 16
Recognition of employees’ desire for security and the company’s need to maximise
flexibility (flexicurity) (IPA)
11
aExcludes the TUC principle ‘Openness and transparency’ and the IPA principle ‘Effective representation of
people’s views within the organisation’ as these are too unspecific to measure.
bMore restrictive interpretations.
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In relation to the first aim of this article, therefore, it would appear that
most partnership agreements do not fully reflect key IPA or TUC principles. For
example, few employers commit to providing employment security and few
unions commit to flexible working. This finding is surprising given that the IPA
and the TUC, as well as other agencies, have actively promoted these partner-
ship principles in Britain for well over a decade. Partnership agreements in
Britain, it seems, display only modest aims.
Provisions
Substantive provisions
Given that most partnership agreements in Britain lack many of the partnership
principles expected, it is questionable whether they will contain provisions rep-
resenting a broadening of substantive scope. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of the
sample of partnership agreements contain one or more substantive provisions,
while just over one-third (37%) contain no substantive provisions at all (Table 2).
Distinguishing between core and non-core substantive issues (Moore et al.,
2004), one-quarter of partnership agreements include provisions on the core
issue of pay (26% of agreements), and one-fifth include hours (21%) and work-
ing conditions (21%). As reported above, the sample of agreements contains no
employment guarantees. The low incidence of provisions covering other, non-
core, issues in the sample of agreements is as follows: training (29%), equal
opportunities (22%), redundancies (20%), family friendly practices (18%), sick
pay (14%), pensions (13%) and single status (10%). Most partnership agree-
ments, therefore, make only limited substantive provisions. On this evidence, it
would appear that as well as displaying modest aims, typical formal partnership
agreements in Britain are substantively hollow.
Procedural provisions
Most partnership agreements (90%) in the sample include procedural provisions
relating to: cooperative statements of intent; the unions party to agreements
Table 2 The substantive and procedural provisions in partnership agreements, 1990–2007 (n=126)
Substantive and Procedural Provisions % including
One or more substantive provision 63
Involve union representatives in joint decision making 82
Establishes new consultative forum 68
Separate provision for negotiations 61
No-strike clause 3
Compulsory arbitration 7
Status quo clause 19
Consultation covers strategic issues 41
Consultation covers policy issues 47
Consultation covers workplace issues 38
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(mean 4, range 19); union bargaining rights; the mechanisms through which
union representatives make inputs into management decisions; and union facil-
ities. Nearly two-thirds (63%) make no provision for dispute resolution
machinery and only nine agreements (7%) specify compulsory arbitration.
Notably, only four agreements (3%) contain a no-strike clause: Her Majesty’s
Prison Service, 2005; Scottish Prison Service, 2003; Government Communications
Headquarters, 1997; and the Offshore Contractors Association, 2006.
Over four-fifths of agreements (82%) contain explicit provisions to involve
workplace union representatives in joint decision-making. More than two-
thirds of agreements (68%) establish new consultative forums and many detail
their composition and remit. Where specified, partnership consultation covers
strategic issues in two-fifths of cases (41%), policy issues in just under half of
cases (47%), and workplace issues in just over one-third of agreements (38%).
Arguably, however, the emphasis on consultation over business-led agendas
in partnership agreements may serve to weaken or even displace collective bar-
gaining and so undermine union efficacy (Bacon and Storey, 2000; Danford et al.,
2005; Kelly, 2004; Marks et al., 1998). If this is so, then partnership agreements
should restrict, exclude or simply omit negotiation, and so effectively limit union
rights and power (see Oxenbridge and Brown, 2005: 92–3). Yet our findings
suggest partnership employers run parallel systems of consultation and negotia-
tion. The majority of partnership agreements (61%) contain explicit provisions
for negotiation over general terms and conditions of employment. Nevertheless,
as explained, these agreements are substantively hollow, so precisely what is
negotiable is rarely specified. One-third of the agreements analysed (33%) dis-
tinguish partnership consultation machinery from traditional bargaining by
recognising that unions negotiate over terms and conditions in separate arenas.
On this analysis, it seems, partnership agreements in Britain may not always be
antithetical to collective bargaining and in some cases they may represent the
maturation of employer and union policy beyond the traditional adversarialism
of British industrial relations, although this possibility remains to be tested.
In relation to the second aim of this article, therefore, it would appear that the
general lack of substantive content reflects the modest aims of the typical British
partnership agreement. Most agreements, it seems, are substantively hollow. In
addition, many display the procedural bias of traditional British collective agree-
ments and promote joint consultation as an adjunct, rather than an alternative, to
the collective bargaining process. Given that most unions have signed substan-
tively hollow partnership agreements that do not appear to limit employers’ auton-
omy, it seems plausible that the procedural bias of partnership agreements
indicates continuing mutual distrust. The lowest common denominator in these
partnership agreements is that employers promise to involve unions when making
decisions, in return for a union commitment to the success of the organisation.
The balance of interests
The lack of partnership principles and substantive content in our sample of part-
nership agreements appears to support Kelly’s (2004) argument that employer
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interests dominate labour interests. However, what has not yet been demon-
strated here is the proportion of agreements where unions commit to employer
success without employer reciprocation – this  indicates constitutes a more direct
test of employer dominance. Table 3 shows that employers and unions make
reciprocal commitments in just over three-quarters (76%) of agreements. This is
important because it shows that most employers make concessions when signing
these agreements and unions as institutions make gains. Indeed, in two-fifths
(41%) of cases, the largest group of agreements in our sample, employers com-
mit to both sharing success and to union participation in employers’ decisions,
while unions commit to the success of the organisation. Arguably, these three
key commitments express the basis for ‘labour-parity’ arrangements in that both
parties may gain. Typical examples of such agreements include Avon Cosmetics,
2006, DHL, 2007, Ethel Austin, 2002, Eurotunnel, 2000, and nine separate
NHS Scotland Area Health Boards, 2003–6. The different permutations of these
three commitments suggest five further forms of partnership agreement.
The second most frequent form of partnership agreement (35% of cases)
involves union commitments to the success of the organisation and employer
commitments to union participation in employers’ decisions but without an
employer commitment to sharing the success of the organisation. These agree-
ments appear designed to improve industrial relations cooperation; and unions,
rather than employees, appear the immediate beneficiaries (Terry, 2003: 462).
Typical examples of these agreements include the Driver and Vehicle Licensing
Agency, 2004, National Air Traffic Services, 2003, S & A Foods, 2002, and
Scottish Widows, 1999.
In contrast to predictions that ‘employer dominant agreements will be
widespread in Britain’ (Kelly, 2005: 195), employers appear to dominate the
content of less than one in 10 partnership agreements (8%), whereby unions
Table 3 Six types of partnership agreement, 1990–2007 (n=126) 
Type Contenta Number (%)
Mutual gains Union commitment to the success of the organisation;
employer commitments to sharing success within the
company, and union input into employers’ decisions. 
51 (41)
Cooperative industrial
relations
Union commitment to the success of the organisation;
employer commitment to union input into employers’
decisions. 
44 (35)
Employer dominant Union commitment to the success of the organisation only. 10 (8)
Union bypassing Union commitment to the success of the organisation;
employer commitment to sharing success within the
company. 
9 (7)
Strong union Employer commitments to sharing success within the
company, and union input into employers’ decisions. 
8 (6)
Shallow None of these three commitments 4 (3)
aWe classify partnership agreements according to the presence of three key commitments: success of the
enterprise, sharing success and input into employers’ decisions.
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commit to the success of the organisation but employers do not reciprocate
and commit to sharing success, or cede union participation in employers’
decisions. Typical examples of these agreements include British Bakeries,
2000, North Bristol NHS Primary Care Trust, 2003, and Rolls-Royce
(Bristol), 1999.
A similar number of agreements (7%) do not include provision for union
participation in employers’ decisions but do contain union commitments to
the success of the organisation and employer commitments to sharing the
gains of organisational success. In this small group of agreements, it seems
unions are less central to the partnership process and the emphasis may be on
direct forms of employee involvement. Examples of these agreements include
Accenture HR Services, 2004, Hays Personnel (Managed Solutions), 2004,
and Kelly Services, 2005.
Several agreements (6%) involve employer concessions but unions do not
commit to the success of the enterprise. With the exception of the private sec-
tor agreements of Go North East, 2004 and the Offshore Contractors Association,
2006, these are multiple-union agreements in the public sector.
The six forms of partnership agreement are presented in Table 4 by private
and public sector, and by government term of office. Note that five of the six
Table 4 Types of agreement by sector and government term, 1990–2007 (n=126)
Number of Agreements Signed by 
Government Term
Sector Type of Agreement 1990–1997 1997–2000 2001–4 2005–7 Total
Private Mutual Gains 3 5 5 6 19
Cooperative IR 2 6 5 0 13
Employer Dominant 0 5 1 0 6a
Bypassing 1 0 2 2 5
Strong Union 0 0 1 1 2
Shallow 0 1 0 3 4
Private Sector Total 6 17 14 12 49
Public Mutual Gains 0 3 14 15 32
Cooperative IR 0 4 15 12 31
Employer Dominant 0 0 2 2 4
Bypassing 0 1 2 1 4
Strong Union 0 1 1 4 6
Shallow 0 0 0 0 0
Public Sector Total 0 9 34 34 77b
a50 percent of private sector Employer Dominant agreements have not survived, representing the highest
mortality rate of all agreement types (cf. Bacon and Samuel, 2009).
bIncludes 50 agreements in NHS England, NHS Scotland and NHS Wales of which 23 are Mutual Gains
agreements and 19 are Cooperative IR agreements.
employer dominant agreements in the private sector were signed in New Labour’s
first term of office ahead of the passing into statute of the 1999 Employment
Relations Act that provided legal provisions for union recognition. Some
employers, it seems, may have pre-empted this legislation to sign partnership
agreements on their terms. However, the clearest pattern is the surge in mutual
gains and cooperative industrial relations agreements in the public sector dur-
ing New Labour’s second and third terms, totalling four-fifths (29 out of 34) of
public sector agreements signed in New Labour’s second term, and just under
four-fifths (27 out of 34) of public sector agreements in New Labour’s third term.
In relation to the third and final aim of this article therefore, employers
overtly dominate the contents of only a small proportion of agreements (8%).
Indeed, three-quarters (75%) of this sample of partnership agreements are more
appropriately categorised as mutual gains or cooperative industrial relations agree-
ments, although many of these are public sector agreements signed since 2001.
Kelly’s (2004) assertion that partnership agreements permit employer interests to
dominate those of labour is not a feature of this representative sample of agree-
ments. Most partnership agreements exchange union input into employers’ deci-
sions in return for union commitment to the success of the enterprise. Arguably,
the contents of most partnership agreements suggest that unions are securing, at
least on paper, increased institutional centrality under such arrangements.
Conclusion
Since the mid-1990s, partnership at work was promoted in Britain by succes-
sive New Labour governments and organisations representing employers and
trade unions. As part of a broader Third Way approach, employers and unions
were encouraged to adopt partnership agreements containing a set of principles
intended to advance fairness at work. Such agreements, therefore, should con-
tain reciprocal employer-union commitments to deliver mutual gains and estab-
lish the basis for a progressive workplace consensus. However, the reliance on
voluntary agreements, as opposed to state coercion (Adams, 1995), raises the
broader question as to whether New Labour, when in government, succeeded
in encouraging employers and unions to adopt partnership agreements to
deliver mutual gains.
In order to explore this issue, this article presented findings from the largest
and most representative analysis of the contents of partnership agreements
signed in Britain between 1990 and 2007. The first aim was to assess the extent
to which 126 partnership agreements contain partnership principles and estab-
lish the basis for mutual gains. The findings show that many partnership agree-
ments do not contain the expected principles and most have only modest aims.
The second aim was to analyse the substantive and procedural content of part-
nership agreements. The findings demonstrate that most partnership agreements
are substantively hollow and procedurally biased. The third and final aim was
to assess the relative balance of interests expressed in partnership agreements.
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The findings show that employer interests are not dominant, as typical partnership
agreements offer unions increased involvement in employers’ decisions.
These findings have several implications for the Third Way approach to
partnership in Britain, and for understanding the role of power, trust and path
dependency for partnership relations. On the first of these issues, our analysis
suggests the Third Way approach to partnership in Britain has delivered little in
the absence of stronger legal and institutional support for employee participa-
tion and gain sharing. The modest aims of partnership agreements in Britain
highlight clear limits to New Labour’s policy of encouraging partnership agree-
ments. Employers and unions appear remarkably unaffected by the partnership
advice offered by successive New Labour government, the IPA, and the TUC.
New Labour’s attempt to recast Britain’s industrial relations landscape was re-
negotiated downwards without fear of sanction, given New Labour’s reluctance
to confront employers (less so unions), its preference for self-regulation to state
coercion, and the continuing British tradition of state abstentionism in indus-
trial relations. Although the former government and other stakeholders encour-
aged employers to adopt partnership principles, this is a weak incentive in the
private sector compared to other corporate governance pressures that may deter
employers from making promises they cannot keep (Deakin et al., 2002;
Thompson, 2003). Formal partnership agreements have been modest in num-
ber as well as content in the private sector. The findings may appear unsurpris-
ing, as Adams (1995) argues that progressive change in industrial relations
typically requires coercive action by the state. Social partnership in several
northern continental European countries was not the outcome of enlightened
consensus, but followed from decisive state action and the imposition of legal
obligations on employers to consult and bargain with worker representatives.
Without such coercion, the Third Way has not materialised in British industrial
relations.
Partnership is sometimes explained by reference to power (Kelly, 2004) and
the balance of power between employers and labour helps explain the lack of
substantive detail contained in partnership agreements. Since the mid-1990s,
many of the formal institutions for joint regulation in unionised workplaces
have remained in place but unions have found it increasingly difficult to influ-
ence employer policy. Partnership agreements appear to reflect this trend, with
employers reluctant to make substantive concessions so retaining their prerog-
ative to determine unilaterally key substantive provisions (see Bacon and
Storey, 2000). As many employers do not make significant substantive com-
mitments in partnership agreements it seems highly unlikely that partnership
will have a discernable positive impact on employee terms and conditions (see
Kelly, 2004).
As employers do not usually make substantive concessions in partnership
agreements, the question arises why a significant number of employers signed
partnership agreements providing for union input into employers’ decisions.
Perhaps the simplest explanation is that partnership agreements describe a rela-
tionship that most unionised employers should prefer to adversarial relations.
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Partnership agreements rarely fail through employer defection, suggesting their
interests are not best served by reversion to more adversarial relationships
(Bacon and Samuel, 2009).
Employer motives towards unions probably differ in the British private and
public sectors. Private sector employers, when signing partnership agreements,
appear to seek a general commitment from unions to accept the business must
be successful in return for consulting unions over change. It is clearly in the
employers’ interests to sign such limited agreements that do not restrict their
autonomy. Thus, partnership agreements may not provide for actual union influ-
ence on employers’ decisions and some case studies suggest this is often limited
in practice (Upchurch et al., 2008). A different explanation is feasible in the pub-
lic sector, where employers seek to engage stronger unions in discussion over
market-based reforms to avoid industrial action. Partnership agreements in the
public sector, arguably, represent ‘an uneasy truce’ between unions resisting mar-
ket-based reforms and managers unable to modernise services without engaging
staff in the process (Bacon and Samuel, 2009: 244). Historically, this situation
seems to be business as usual for public sector industrial relations in Britain.
Given that the growth in the number of agreements has been in the public sec-
tor and the NHS in particular, future research may usefully explore whether vol-
untarism adequately describes the government’s approach in this sector.
Our findings also suggest unions make few concessions and therefore have
little to lose by signing partnership agreements that are substantively hollow
and procedurally biased. Unions in the private sector implicitly support busi-
ness success and at least a formal partnership agreement may help remind
employers to consult with unions. However, public sector unions signing these
agreements do not formally commit to public sector reforms and so may sign
partnership agreements to engage employers in debates over proposed changes
to improve public services. Both private sector and public sector employers and
unions, therefore, appear to make limited commitments in order to manage the
perceived risks associated with partnership (Martínez Lucio and Stuart, 2005).
The absence of ambition in partnership agreements appears also to reflect
the low-trust equilibrium in British industrial relations. Indeed, only two-fifths
of agreements conform to an underlying mutual gains model. The absence of
the expected partnership principles in most agreements suggests traditional
low-trust relationships underpin these agreements. Both employers and unions
have probably made optimum concessions in partnership agreements given the
degree to which they feel reciprocation is possible. Thus, agreements fall a long
way short of the promise of mutual gains and may reflect distrust between
employers and unions. The limited ambition of partnership agreements in
Britain is, perhaps, inevitable as employers in liberal market economies cannot
realistically keep promises to share financial gains with employees, or to pro-
vide employment security, let alone job security, given increased product-
market competition and shareholder pressure (Sisson et al., 1999; Thompson,
2003). Clearly, high-trust relationships are difficult to establish in an institu-
tional context encouraging low trust.
445The contents of partnership agreements in Britain 1990–2007 Samuel and Bacon
A final explanation of our findings is that partnership agreements appear
path dependent. Partnership agreements reflect the lack of substantive content
and contain the procedural bias previously noted in traditional collective agree-
ments (Dunn and Wright, 1994; Flanders, 1968). The non-statutory approach
to partnership in Britain by former New Labour governments does not appear
to have changed traditional arms-length, low-trust approaches to industrial
relations in Britain.
These findings are consistent with previous evidence that many organisa-
tions in Britain have made only limited progress towards a partnership approach
(Bacon and Storey, 2000; Guest and Peccei, 2001). It appears that voluntary
partnership agreements are weak instruments for extending fairness at work in
the low-trust industrial relations contexts of liberal market economies, such as
Britain. Despite the partnership rhetoric of New Labour’s Third Way since
1997–2010, it seems that in the absence of stronger statutory and institutional
supports for employee participation and gain sharing, voluntary partnership
agreements in Britain express only modest aims of limited ambition.
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